RELIBERTASAUN: Juli 2012

Friendship Observer Mission Head of Mission: Endie van Binsbergen
HP: (+670) 712 2161 Email: friendship.observers@gmail.com
Fatuhada, Dili, Timor-Leste

Table of Contents

1.0 Acknowledgements .................................................................. 3
2.0 Executive Summary.................................................................. 4
3.0 Friendship Observer Mission (FOM) overview .......................... 5
4.0 Election Campaign Observations .............................................. 8
5.0 Voter registration/Voter cards................................................. 9
6.0 Election Day observations and concerns ................................ 10
6.1. Indelible ink ...................................................................10
6.2. Photos in the Polling Centres ............................................10
6.3. Party Agents (Fiscais) ......................................................11
6.4. Print Quality of Ballots .....................................................12
6.5. Position of Voting Booths .................................................12
6.6. Assistance to Disabled Persons .........................................13
6.7. Ballot Box and Seals........................................................13
6.8. Instructions of Ballot Controllers .......................................14
6.9. Checking ID/Voter Card ...................................................14
6.10. Security .........................................................................15
6.11. Smoking inside the Polling Stations ...................................15
6.12. Advance Preparations of Ballots by Ballot Controllers...........15
6.13. Task Focus of Polling Centre Officials .................................16
6.14. Counting Procedures........................................................16
7.0 Conclusions ............................................................................ 17

Appendix A: Reports submitted to CNE, STAE and President’s Office
(29 June 2012)............................................................................... 18

Appendix B: Reports concerning alleged payment or pressure for votes .............................................................................................. 21

1.0 Acknowledgements

The Friendship Observer Mission (FOM) has been supported by generous grants from DOTG e.V. (the German East Timor Society), VOT (Free East Timor Foundation, The Netherlands), Swinburne University of Technology (Australia) and by personal contributions from FOM’s international observers.

Barry Wohl, Janina Pawelz, Jose A. Abi Siqui, Evaristo dos Reis and Endie van Binsbergen authored this report.

2.0 Executive Summary

This report summarizes observations gathered by the five teams of the Friendship Observer Mission (FOM) in Dili, Ermera, Ainaro, Baucau and Oe-cusse in the period from 20 June 2012 to 7 July 2012.

The Friendship Observer Mission presented an interim report to STAE, CNE and the President’s Office on 29 June, and will publish a final report with recommendations towards improvements for future elections in Timor-Leste by the end of July 2012.

First of all, the Friendship Observer Mission would like to compliment STAE and CNE for a positive and well-organized election period. We congratulate the national observer groups for sending considerable numbers of observers into the field. Overall, we credit STAE and CNE for facilitating transparent, free and fair elections in a highly competent manner. Observers noted and congratulate Timor-Leste on the generally peaceful and stable environment in which these elections took place.

3.0 Friendship Observer Mission (FOM) overview

The Friendship Observer Mission (FOM) was initiated to bring experienced international observers and highly motivated young Timorese nationals together in combined teams. One thing all of these observers have in common: the wish to contribute to the democratic process in Timor-Leste by monitoring and evaluating the Parliamentary Elections in 2012. FOM is headed by Ms. Endie van Binsbergen, current chairperson of the Free East Timor Foundation (VOT) in The Netherlands. She has a record of many years in Timor-Leste’s solidarity network and several election observation missions, including the Popular Consultation on Self-Determination in 1999, Elections to the Constituent Assembly in 2001, Presidential Elections in 2002 and the Legislative Elections in 2007.

International FOM participants came from The Netherlands, Germany, Australia, Canada and the United States.

The mission was launched on the 10th of June. Prior to the elections, on 7 July, FOM observers visited authorities, local NGOs, party offices and political campaign events around Dili, Liquica and Oecusse. On Election Day, FOM observers monitored voting and vote counting in Dili, Ainaro, Ermera, Baucau and Oecusse districts.

Table 1 contains the complete list of FOM observers and Table 2 describes FOM’s logistical support team.

Table 1: Nationalities of FOM observers

Observer Nationality

Endie van Binsbergen (Head of Mission) The Netherlands
Francisca Cecilia X. dos Santos Timor-Leste
Nancy Perdita Correia Lebre Timor-Leste
Evaristo dos Reis Timor-Leste
Ermelinda Soares Timor-Leste

Lucas Soares Timor-Leste
Avelino Soares Timor-Leste
Angelica Maria Fatima de Deus Timor-Leste
Horta Neves Pereira Timor-Leste
Joao Martins Taneseb Siqui Timor-Leste

Octaviano Bana Timor-Leste
Jose A. Abi Siqui Timor-Leste
Michael Leach Australia
Janina Pawelz Germany
Michelle Thompson USA
Barry Wohl Canada

Table 2: Nationalities of FOM logistical support team members

Duarte X. Amaral Marques Timor-Leste
Natalino Godinho Soares Timor-Leste

FOM teams observed in five of Timor-Leste’s thirteen districts, as shown in Figure 1

Figure 1: Districts visited by FOM observers

FOM observers were able to conduct their observation activities in a number of polling
centres in each district. Notably, outside of Dili, FOM observers reached polling centres
where few other observers were.

Table 3: FOM observation coverage

District Polling Centre Stations

Ainaro ES Central Maubisse 3
Ainaro EP Liquite 1
Baucau Sede Letemuno 2
Baucau Baguia 1
Baucau S. Domingos Savio 3
Baucau Caibada Uaimua 1
Dili EPS 30 Agostu 4
Dili EP Caicoli 2
Dili EP No 2 Vila Verde 3
Dili Sede Suco Colmera 1
Dili EP Farol 4
Dili EP Meti-Aut 1
Dili EP Bidau 4
Dili Hati Kudus Becora 4
Ermera EP Estado 3
Ermera EP Ducurai 2
Ermera EP Goulolo 1
Oecusse EP Meco-Sikaloti 1
Oecusse EP Oelulan 1
Oecusse EP Oebaha 1
Oecusse EP Padiae 1
Oecusse EP Masin 3
Oecusse EP Noapa’i 2
Oecusse EP Bihala 2

Total Polling Stations monitored by FOM 49

4.0 Election Campaign Observations

Election campaign observations made during the period 20-29 June, 2012 are given in Appendix A. Those observations were submitted b email to CNE, STAE and the Office of the President on 30 June, 2012. Observations on campaigning were also gathered in the period of 30 June until 4 July.

The primary observation made during that period was the presence of weapons at campaign events, an observation that was also described in the FOM interim report. Figures 2-4 hereunder show the presence of weapons during campaigns. We wish to express our deepest concern about the publicly visible presence of a hand gun at the PD rally in Dili on 4 July. We also observed the use and display of the surik (traditional sword) at several campaigns. We fully respect and appreciate the traditional dress at large public popular gatherings, but wonder if the presence of this sword might be in contrast with the calls for peaceful campaign.

Our observers monitored the CNRT campaign on 3 July in Lifau, Oe-cusse and clearly heard and understood a member of Fretilin Resistensia (supportive of CNRT) speaking on stage, while he stated in Baikeno dialect: “Any party who raises a flag or banner from another party in Lele-Ufe village, will be forced to take it down. If they don’t take down their flag or banner, then Fretilin Resistensia itself will take it down. In Lele-Ufe village, only the flag or banner of CNRT shall be raised.” This speaker was recognized as the village chief of Lele-Ufe (Nitibe sub-district). We consider these words as a serious restriction of people’s or parties’ right to express.

Of more concern, some issues surrounding the campaign period require further investigation and we strongly suggest full investigation by relevant authorities as to whether these issues were in compliance with Timor-Leste’s electoral laws. These include publicly reported corporate donations to the CNRT and the many reports our observers in Oecusse received on payment for voters by Frenti-Mudanca (See Appendix B: Reports on alleged payment or pressure for votes)

Figure 2: Political rally in Dili on 4 July. The supporter in the foreground has a gun in his right hand (picture courtesy Pamela Martin).

Figure 3: Weapons observed at a campaign event in Dili on 3 July.

Figure 4: CNRT rally at Lifau, Oecusse, on 3 July.
PM Xanana Gusmão speaks on stage in traditional dress, complete with surik (traditional sword)

5.0 Voter registration/Voter cards

Oe-cusse: When visiting a senior high school in Naimeco, we found that a high number of scholars older than 17 were not yet registered for a voter card. At a nearby junior high school, the director expressed concern about young people not being eager to take part in the election.

Oe-cusse: In the week before Election Day, we received reports from people who were waiting for their voter card and did not know if they would be able to vote. Two days before the elections, we heard the announcements from a driving car stating that people could pick up their card. Some voter cards were delivered with the sensitive material on 6 July. Some voter cards were then delivered to the persons and some stayed at the polling centres.

6.0 Election Day observations and concerns
6.1. Indelible ink

Observations

Overall: FOM observed that in most polling stations voters’ index fingers were not checked before voting. Furthermore, in many cases only small amounts of ink was applied on voters’ fingers.

Dili: After voting at Caicoli, a FOM national observer was able to completely clean the right index finger such that only a tiny dot remained on the fingernail. (Please refer to Appendix A, Concern 3: report on indelible ink quality.)

Ermera: FOM observers noticed some irregularities concerning the application of ink and the checking. At least one person at the polling centre in Ducurai did not get her finger inked as she didn’t dip her finger deep enough into the ink. Furthermore, at least one person in Estado got his left hand index finger inked instead of the right hand one. In general, polling staff did not thoroughly check if an index finger of a voter had been inked previously.

Oe-cusse: All FOM observers in Oe-cusse noted that in none of the visited polling centres the fingers of voters were checked on ink before allowing to vote. In at least one polling centre, FOM observers saw that many voters had their left index finger inked instead of the right index finger.

6.2. Photos in the Polling Centres

Observations

Airnaro/Dili/Oe-cusse: Observers freely took pictures during the reception of sensitive
materials, the opening procedures and the counting.

Ermera: There appeared to be confusion about the regulation on observers taking pictures
inside the polling stations. The Presiding Officers of the polling centres in Estado and
Ducurai prohibited observers from taking pictures inside the room during the Election Day.
In Ducurai, observers were not allowed to take pictures of the ballot boxes in the polling
station on 6 July, shortly after the reception of the materials. Observers were also not
allowed to take pictures of the counting process in Ducurai. Presiding Officers of the polling
centres in Estado and Ducurai explained to observers that they had been instructed to
prevent anybody from taking pictures inside the polling station and that only pictures
outside the building were allowed. At one incident, CPLP staff harshly criticized FOM
international observers in a rude manner for taking pictures in the compound of the polling
centre, even outside the polling station. A phone call to CNE clarified that CPLP staff was
misinformed after which they apologized to the FOM observers.

Figure 5: voter showing inked left index finger.

6.3. Party Agents (Fiscais)

Observations

Overall: FOM observers noticed a high number of fiscais whose ID badge had no photo and noted in fact several fiscais using ID badge that did not belong to him/her. Ermera/Ainaro: FOM observers noticed that many party agents did not prominently display their ID badges. The most common observation was that the badges were worn underneath the shirt, making it impossible to identify the fiscais as legitimate and authorized by STAE.

Dili: FOM observed a high number of fiscais whose ID badge had no photo and wonders why adding a pass photo could be a logistic difficulty in Dili city. In Bebonuk, FOM observers received reports from the community about a fiscal (FRETILIN) pressing a voter to vote twice. This report was confirmed by two other fiscais (CNRT). In Caicoli, fiscais were performing polling staff tasks such as replacing a nail in a voting booth an re-adjusting a collapsed voting booth’s desktop. In Farol polling centre, FOM observed fiscais (FRETILIN) having amicable conversations with polling staff, while openly sharing food and coffee. In Villa Verde, a FRETILIN fiscal (with no picture on his ID badge) stood close to the voting booth and openly suggested to voters to vote for FRETILIN or PDL.

Oe-cusse: FOM observed a fiscal (PD) being removed from polling centre Meco-Sikaloti, as the Presiding Officer had identified him as not the actual person on the ID card. In Oelulan, a fiscal (PDN) who kept his badge under his shirt in fact told one of our observers that he was using another man’s badge (please refer to Appendix A, Concern 1). At the Oebaha polling centre, FOM observed a party agent helping polling staff by giving directions to voters inside the polling station. When shared with the present CNE monitor, the latter responded calmly: “He is only helping”. FOM observers in Oe-cusse received concerns from several community members about the high number of illiterate fiscais. On Election Day, FOM observers in fact noted this high number of illiterate party agents.

Baucau: FOM saw no fiscais without a photo on their ID badge. At the Baguia polling centre, FOM observed several fiscais who verbally gave instructions to voters on folding their ballot paper before bringing it to the ballot box. At Letemuno, the fiscais (and some observers) witnessed the choice of voters who needed assistance for casting their vote. Ainaro/Oe-cusse: On a number of occasions, FOM observed fiscais having conversations with voters in the queue or on the way to the voting booth. None of these conversations raised serious concerns, but are nevertheless inappropriate.

6.4. Print Quality of Ballots

Observations

Dili: FOM observers noted that ballots in several villages were printed with small dots dispersed across the paper, which in some cases looked very similar to small pinholes. The dots made it appear as though the ballot had been prepared with a vote for the PDN party. This was confusing and distressing to voters. Additionally, the printing quality of the ballots was clearly substandard. The colors of the party flags were incorrect on some ballots, which led to complications for those voters who depend on recognizing the party flag. As a result, voting was halted at Becora for half an hour as CNE and STAE checked the ballots, following at least one voter’s complaint.

The delay occasioned by the poor quality ballots compounded a late start at Becora. Voting did not commence until 7.15am and the large queues progressed slowly. Once the voting was interrupted, the crowd became increasingly impatient and at one point STAE staff requested our presence as they had concerns for their safety.

At this stage, FOM does not know how widespread this problem was. None of our observers who monitored the elections in other districts encountered this problem.

6.5. Position of Voting Booths

Observations

Overall: At most polling centres (except in Baucau) monitored by FOM observers there seemed to be confusion about the positioning of the voting booths related to last-minute instructions provided to polling centre officers. At most polling centres that we monitored, the position of the voting booths and the closeness of the fiscais compromised the voters’ right to a secret ballot.

Ermera: FOM observers saw two CPLP at Estado polling centre who instructed the Presiding Officer to re-arrange the voting booths conform the new regulations (back-to-back). The Presiding Officer then explained that re-arrangement of the voting booths was not possible due to the architectural design of the school which had open windows on two sides. According to the Presiding Officer, the wind could easily topple voting booths if these were positioned in the middle of the room, back-to-back.

In Ducurai, the voting booths were oriented to the ceiling. Additionally, the windows were covered with cardboard and blocked with chairs and tables thus preventing anybody from looking inside the polling station.

Oe-cusse: At the opening of the polling station in Meco-Sikaloti, the position of the voting booths enabled observers and fiscais to easily see the voter’s choice. This was corrected when the Presiding Officer draw lines on the floor and then firmly directed the fiscais to sit on the floor in the marked area. At the polling stations of Meco-Sikaloti and Oebaha, FOM observers saw that the desktop of a polling booth had collapsed, leaving a big gap which confused the voter in the booth. FOM observed that polling staff did not notice this and kept directing voters to this booth, until the FOM observer pointed it out to the Presiding Officer.

Dili: In Caicoli, the position of voting booths easily allowed fiscais and observers to have a clear look at the voters’ choice.

Baucau: FOM observed that the position of voting booths guaranteed the secret of vote.

6.6. Assistance to Disabled Persons

Observations

Overall: At all polling centres that FOM observed elderly, disabled persons and pregnant women were given priority in the queue and in most cases assisted very well when needed. However, we did observe some issues.

Ermera: FOM observers were shocked when witnessing the behaviour of fiscais and polling staff who laughed instead of supported an old and nearly blind man at the polling centre in Estado. The old man obviously had difficulties reading the ballot paper. Party agents laughed aloud watching the old man attempting to read the ballot paper. The laughter increased when the old man said that he could not read the ballot paper. As another voter approached the old man’s booth and attempted to assist him, polling staff prohibited this, but made no efforts to offer assistance. When the old man cast his vote, everyone in the room could see his choice, and again when the old man had difficulties folding the ballot paper. When the Presiding Officer entered the station and saw the old man, she noticed his desperation and immediately assisted him correctly.

Oe-cusse: At the polling centre in Meco-Sikaloti, an old and nearly blind man had received his ballot paper but stood in the middle of the room looking around for 2-3 minutes. It seemed obvious to the FOM observers that the man was waiting for assistance. As polling staff did not pay attention to him and continued procedures for other voters, the old man found his way to the booth. Observers heard him counting aloud to the party of his choice before punching the ballot paper. The old man seemed disoriented, but eventually made his way to the ballot box, the ink and finally the exit by himself.

Baucau: At Letemuno, the Presiding Officer called fiscais and observers to witness the choice of a blind voter who needed assistance to cast his vote. The party of his choice was said aloud by the polling staff who assisted him, and everyone in the room could hear this. Also at Letemuno, an elderly voter was shaking severely and to such extend that the entire voting booth was shaking when he attempted to vote. The Presiding Officer called all the present fiscais and observers to witness his choice while being assisted by polling staff. At the polling centre in Baguia, FOM observed a nearly blind person who asked the polling staff for assistance. Polling staff told him to find a family member; they did not offer assistance.

6.7. Ballot Box and Seals

Observations

Overall: All FOM observers noted that at all monitored polling stations the ballot box controllers guarded the ballot box at all times, performing their task excellently.

Oe-cusse: At one polling station, FOM observers saw how the lid of a polling box did not fully close the box at the time the box was replaced. The lid slightly stood up in the middle, leaving the possibility to add or take ballot papers even after the slot was sealed. Our observer did not suspect that the number of allowed ballots was exceeded. More likely seems the possibility that, due to lack of instructions on how to fold the ballot paper, the box was not filled up efficiently.

Dili: At Caicoli polling centre, FOM observers saw that no seal was applied to the slot of the ballot box when the box was full and ready to be replaced. When required why the third seal was not applied to the slot, polling staff explained that the seal would not be applied until 3:00pm. FOM observers noticed that it left the possibility for additional ballots to be added.

6.8. Instructions of Ballot Controllers

Observations

Overall: FOM observed that Ballot Controllers did not explain to voters how to cast a vote and that no instructions were given on folding the ballot paper after the vote. FOM observed many voters who rolled the ballot paper, many who brought their ballot paper out unfolded, and many who folded the paper so many times that they had to force the paper through the slot (this may result in ripping the paper and invalidating the vote). In most of these cases voters were given instruction on folding by the ballot box controller, after voting. Oe-cusse: At one polling centre, FOM observers saw the Ballot Controller give very clear instructions to each voter. FOM noted that at this particular centre no voters seemed to have difficulties with folding the ballot and no voter brought the ballot paper out unfolded. At the other six centres that FOM observed, the ballot controllers gave no instructions and many voters brought out the ballot paper unfolded or rolled-up.

Ermera: Ballot Controllers were observed handing out the ballot papers without explaining the voters how to cast a valid vote. The number of invalid and blank votes added up to 34 in Ducurai (2.85%).

Dili: FOM observed that in none of the Dili polling centres clear instruction were given by the ballot controller on how to cast a vote or how to fold the ballot paper. In Caicoli, a voter folded the ballot paper twice before punching the ballot with the nail. Polling staff did not notice this, until a FOM observer pointed this out to the Secretary who gave the person a new ballot paper and instructions.

Baucau: At Bahu polling centre, FOM observed that the ballot controller left post when no voters were coming, leaving the ballot papers unattended. The ballot controller gave no instructions to voters on folding the ballot paper after voting. Ainaro: None of the ballot controllers gave instructions to voters on how to cast a vote, no instructions on folding the ballot paper. At ES Central Maubisse, the invalid and blank votes added up to 74 (5.8%).

6.9. Checking ID/Voter Card

Observations

Overall: FOM noted that ID/Voter Cards were thoroughly checked and voters’ names were crossed off the list with precision.

Dili: In Caicoli, a fiscal who did not bring his voter card was allowed to identify himself with his Fiscais ID badge and vote. FOM questions this decision, as the Fiscais ID badges were easily exchanged or forged.

6.10. Security

Observations

Overall: FOM observers noted that PNTL officers acted appropriately and with a great deal
of respect for the voting process. None of our observers felt or assumed that voters were
not comfortable with the presence of PNTL officers, even when slightly closer to the polling
centre than the required minimum of 25 meters. In a few isolated cases, however, PNTL
officers did not remove their weapons before entering the polling station.

Dili: Armed PNTL were observed at Farol voting centre, closer than required distance.

Oecusse: Our observer at Oelulan witnessed how one policeman efficiently held the other
policeman’s pistol, allowing the latter to enter the polling station unarmed. Also at Oelulan
polling centre, FOM witnessed at 12.50 how two PNTL and the polling centre Secretary
verbally and physically intervened fighting youth at the soccer field located directly next to
the polling centre, as UN police watched from inside their car.

Baucau: At Baguia and Letemuno, FOM observed armed PNTL closer than 25 meters from
the polling station. When shared with the Presiding Officer, our observer was informed that
this close presence of armed PNTL was not requested by the polling staff.

6.11. Smoking inside the Polling Stations

Observations

Baucau: At Bahu, FOM observed the ballot controller telling people to not smoke inside.

Ainaro: FOM observed consistent smoking inside the polling stations, mainly by polling staff. Alarmingly, the frequency of smoking increased during the counting of votes, when the paper ballots were piled on tables. Smoking is a serious fire hazard and could lead to ballot papers being damaged or destroyed. Furthermore, a smoke-filled polling station and polling staff with burning cigarettes do not represent the professional image of STAE.

Dili: In Caicoli, FOM observed polling staff and fiscais smoking together and sharing cigarettes inside polling station nr 3.

6.12. Advance Preparations of Ballots by Ballot Controllers

Observations

Ainaro: In Maubisse and Liquite, FOM observed ballot controllers pre-stamping and signing ballots. In most cases, controllers prepared 3-4 ballots ahead of time, and handed a stamped ballot to the voter as they arrived at the table to receive it. This method may well result in extra stamped ballots at the closure of the polling centre.

6.13. Task Focus of Polling Centre Officials

Observations

Overall: As expected, most polling centres processed the majority of their voters within the first hour. Consequently, many polling centres, especially in rural areas, were relatively quiet for the remainder of the day.

Ermera/Ainaro: FOM observed polling staff leaving the room or sleeping partly on a ballot box.

Baucau: In the early afternoon at Bahu polling centre, FOM observed the ballot controller leave post when no voters were coming, leaving the ballot papers unattended several times.

Dili: In Caicoli, the Presiding Officer had to call one polling staff to return to his task during the counting procedures.

6.14. Counting Procedures

Observations

Oe-cusse: In Oelulan, fiscais and observers were not allowed inside the counting area, as the Presiding Officer decided that there was not enough space. Fiscais and national and international observers were directed to take their position behind the surrounding wall, while the Presiding Officer took position at the back of the counting area. This created a distance between the wall and the Presiding Officer that seriously complicated monitoring the ruling. FOM national and international observers present at the counting could not observe the ruling at all (see figure 6).

Ainaro: In ES Central Maubisse, the ballot boxes from the three polling stations were counted separately, in contrast with the required mixing of all ballots at that specific centre. Ainaro/Ermera: At the polling centres monitored Ainaro and Ermera, FOM observed that no groups of 50 (or 100) were counted before ruling on the votes.

Dili: In Caicoli the final count of the votes mistakenly resulted in two extra votes for CNRT, which was protested by all present fiscais and observers and STAE staff had to repeat the entire counting process until the mistake was found and corrected. According to FOM observers, this mistake could occur due to insufficient preparation of the counting board. In Farol, fiscais FRETILIN harshly protested that STAE did not count correctly and ordered a recount of the votes. This fiscais in fact stated that STAE staff was incapable and that they might as well tear up all the ballots. STAE staff and fiscais FRETILIN re-counted together, and the result was the same as the initial counting.

Baucau: FOM observed that the counting process in Caibada Uaimua went smooth and well. Figure 5: Observers and fiscais positioned behind the wall surrounding the counting area at Oelulan polling centre, unable to close-monitor the ruling on the ballots.

Figure 6: Insufficient preparation confused the counting at Caicoli, Dili,

7.0 Conclusions

In general, we observed that the voting took place in a calm and peaceful manner organized professionally and free from intimidation or disturbances. We do however have concerns about the legitimacy of political campaigning methods, about voters not being able to reach their polling centre and about the guarantee for secrecy of vote. This report is preliminary and FOM will publish a Final Report with recommendations towards improvements for future elections in Timor-Leste by the end of July 2012.

Appendix A: Reports submitted to CNE, STAE and
President’s Office (29 June 2012)

This appendix contains a report previously submitted electronically. For
completeness, however, its contents are also included in this final report.

Concern 1: observer and party agent identification badges

FOM has observed that observer and party agent badges may be easily reproduced in an unauthorized manner:

• the badges are printed on basic glossy paper and their transparent holders are unsealed;

• the handwritten identification elements of the badge (Name, Passport No., etc.) are easily modified;

• the identification pictures on the badges may be easily substituted;

• the STAE seal (stamp) which is placed partially on the badge paper and partially on the photo, does not show any print on the photos on any of the observer badges that FOM received for its national and international observers.

In summary, the possibility exists for observer identification cards to be forged or reproduced inappropriately.

Additionally, FOM observers received reports that a number of identification badges for party agents were assembled without agent photographs adhered to the cards.

Subsequently, FOM observers witnessed these cards in the STAE office (Dili) and confirmed that a substantial number of party agent badges were being delivered to political parties without agent photographs (Figure 7, Figure 8).

Figure 7: Party representatives receiving party agent badges at STAE offices in Dili

On our enquiries at STAE about the badges without photograph, we were informed that party agents would have to add their picture themselves. This decision, to release party agent badges without photographs, could easily lead to the cards being exchanged and ultimately to unauthorized persons acting as accredited party agents at polling centres and inside polling stations.

Figure 8: Party agents badges with STAE stamps but without photo identification

Concern 2: schedule of STAE briefings and other communications

STAE planned the releaseof critical pieces of information for a briefing on 4 July. Unfortunately, 4 July is past the date by which many observers will have departed from Dili for other districts, and will therefore not be able to attend this briefing. Notably, the release of printed information as well as the T-shirts / vests for the observers on 4 July is too late for these articles to be delivered to observers in the outer districts.

Concern 3: report on indelible ink quality

A political party representative described to FOM observers that he had received reports from the field regarding the indelible quality of some ink brands in use. The reports suggested that some types of ink used at polling centres did not last the required 2-day duration. The representative described that among the brands of ink used nationwide, a majority were expected to perform well but a minority were not expected to remain imprinted on voter fingers for the required duration.

Concern 4: limitations on national observers

FOM is a combined national-international observation mission, and aims to provide a strong collaboration framework between Timorese and foreign observers. Currently, Timorese national observers are required to vote in a specific location based on their registration location. Consequently, national observers are limited in the locations they may observe on Election Day. This is contrary to the spirit of the election code of conduct, which states that both international and national observers have the same rights and privileges to observe the electoral process in the location of their choice.

Concern 5: removal of campaign material

Three political parties have reported to FOM observers that their large campaign banners (commonly seen hanging across Dili streets) have disappeared. The party representatives did not know whether the banners had been stolen or simply torn down. They additionally reported that these occurrences were restricted to Dili.

Concern 6: presence of weapons at campaign events

At a recent political campaign event in Dili, an attendee was observed in full traditional costume including a sword. The attendee entered the event followed by two flag-bearers and may have in fact been a party representative himself. The sword was not brandished or used in a threatening manner. There were about 130 people in attendance at the event and nobody appeared to be intimidated by the presence of this traditional weapon. Nonetheless, a weapon was present at a political campaign event.

Several days later the same person was observed at the campaign event of a different political party. In that instance, the person played a ceremonial role in the proceedings, all while holding the ceremonial surik.

Additionally, a group of young men holding spears and shields were observed at an election campaign. The spears and the shields appeared to be part of the traditional costume they were wearing for a performance.

Appendix B: Reports concerning alleged payment or pressure for votes

In the period 3-10 July, our observer team in Oecusse District team observed in the subdistrict Pante-Makassar. The observers introduced themselves to several local institutions and emphasized that they were willing to receive concerns from the communities. As a result, many people approached the team or came to our office to tell their stories.

Concern 1: Alleged payment for votes by FRENTI-Mudança

• Several weeks before Election Day, a party agent (fiscal) from Oelulan spoke to one of our observers in Dili and said that FRENTI-Mudanca would not perform stage campaigns like CNRT. Instead of campaigning tours, they were preparing groups in all districts, to the sub-districts, to the villages, to the remote sub-villages. The people in those groups were registered on forms and the groups received 150 USD to share amongst each other, in exchange for their promise to vote for FRENTI-Mudanca. The fiscal told our observer that he thought this was a good strategy, because it reached all the way to the remote villages. He added that “the other parties had to beware, because the FRENTIMudanca strategy was very effective”.

• On 20 June, three of our observers visited the FRENTI-Mudanca party office in Dili to introduce our observer mission and receive eventual concerns about the election process. When asked about the campaigning strategy of this party, the spokesperson stated that the party did not plan stage-campaign tours like some of the bigger parties. Instead, the party was preparing groups in the districts and villages which the members regularly visit to give information.

• On 5 July, a person in Naimeco reported to our observers that he had recently been approached by a man who offered him money to help FRENTI-Mudanca get more votes during the parliamentary elections. For this money, the person had to form a small group of people who would vote for FRENTI-Mudanca and then share that money among the group. According to the report, the offered amount of money for the group to be formed would be about 100-200 USD. (One of our observers heard a similar story during the presidential elections: people in Oelulan were offered money to vote for the FRENTIMudanca candidate).

• We received report from a person who lives in the sub-district Passabe: FRENTI-Mudanca members offered money to individuals in Passabe, if they promised to vote for FRENTIMudanca at the 7 July elections.

• On 8 July, a member of PD reported to our observers that a FRENTI-Mudanca representative explained to him that the FRENTI-Mudanca party gave 10 USD per household if they join the group, and one group consists of 15 households. The total amount given to each group is 150 USD.

Concern 2: Alleged pressure to vote and lobby

Received report on FRETILIN, nr. 1

We received several reports about a FRETILIN representative whose name is known by FOM. Allegedly he intended to persuade people to join the FRETILIN campaign brigade. For this, he told people to sign a contract, stating that if FRETILIN would win the elections they would receive thousands of dollars or a nice house – “just come get the key”. To verify these reports, we visited a person who in fact claimed to have been approached by this FRETILIN representative. At his house, the person showed us the list he signed (FRETILIN Household Registration Form). The list showed his full name, the name of his wife and children, including those under 17, and the voter card numbers of him and his wife. The person also showed us the hand phone that the FRETILIN representative had given to him “to work together and lobby more people to vote for the party”.

Figure 9: FRETILIN Household Registration Form & the hand phone mentioned above

After Election Day, the person whom we visited told us that he felt that FRETILIN people were blaming him for not winning the elections. The person said that this was not through words, but through gestures. He stated to us that he considered this approach pushing and threatening.

We asked the person if he was connected to the FRETILIN party in any way before he was approached by the representative. The person told us that he is a member of another party, and that the representative knew this. In fact, we saw a poster clearly posted at the person’s house, showing another party than FRETILIN.

Report on FRETILIN members, nr. 2

An eye witness informed us that in the night before Election Day, a small group of mature FRETILIN members was on the street in Naimeco after a gathering. One member walked in the streets while shouting left and right: “If you don’t vote for FRETILIN than you won’t get any help.”

According to the eye-witness, somebody called the police about the disturbance. As the police arrived, the group ran off.

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Friendship Observer

Source husi ETAN Website

RELIBERTASAUN

Senin, 16 Juli 2012

FOM: Preliminary Report Parliamentary Elections 2012

Minggu, 15 Juli 2012

A preliminary District Analysis of Timor-Leste’s Parliamentary Election, 2012.